Future2

Scenario No new order

Continuity: the orders of today still hold

A world in which the United States, the European Union, China, India and the Global South cluster each still live in 2100 in their own kind of today's order, as they have since 2075, while machines, heat and age have changed much around them.

A scenario is a possibility that the project has constructed, not a forecast. This page condenses the project's working draft of one scenario. Its sentences describe that world; they do not say what will happen.

Its class in the futures cone

The futures cone sorts futures as they look from today. A class is a label judged today, not a probability, and it can change as the evidence does.

  1. 2040probable
  2. 2060plausible
  3. 2100plausible
  • probable: the measured trends of today lead to it
  • plausible: a theory of how societies change leads to it, through mechanisms that have been seen before in other transitions, and at the pace at which they were seen

The idea

In this scenario the forces that wear an order down are met mostly by those who already hold power, in ways that keep each order's kind. Nearly every pressure would end up propping the order up, and deterrence would keep any one power from setting terms for the rest. Each order would have its own support. In the United States and the European Union it would be the checks that courts, unions and rival parties place on power, and in China reform from above. In India and the Global South cluster it would be the incumbents' hold on elections, which also keeps those elections unfair. Consent would rest on a need for people's work that is weakened, not gone. All five cases would have to hold at once, each keeping what defines its kind of order from 2075 to 2100 without a break.

A day in 2100

In Ohio a nurse checks a schedule that a hospital system wrote overnight. Private firms own the hospitals and the machines. Both parties accept the count of the vote again and courts still bind the president, but her brother, out of work since the billing office closed, marches with those who call the vote rigged. In Lyon a retired engineer draws a pension the European Union guarantees, cut a little in each budget round. In Chengdu a district official is scored on output, air and order. The streets are calm, but no free vote shows whether calm means acceptance. In Patna a young man waits for state road work. In Lagos a trader pays a fee to a ward boss and a tax to a city that cannot keep the lights on. Most people care, build, repair, teach, sell and supervise machines. New problems are heat that closes cities in India and the cluster, care for very many old people, and a lasting class with no regular work. The United States and China sabotage each other's data centres without open war, proxy and civil wars burn in parts of the cluster, and migrants from hot countries meet closed borders.

Liberal-democraticParty-stateElectoral developmentalManaged electoralUnited StatesEuropean UnionChinaIndiaGlobal South cluster04240547503644015520Liberal-democraticParty-stateElectoraldevelopmentalManaged electoralUnitedStatesEuropeanUnionChinaIndiaGlobal Southcluster04240547503644015520

The four forms of continuity and the five cases

Rows of an order, of twelve, in which a case's state of 2026 is not one that the form accepts

A coding by the project Each case matches its own form in every row, because the forms describe the cases as they are coded today. The other counts show how far the cases stand from one another's forms.

Continuity is one scenario in four forms: the liberal-democratic form of the United States and the European Union, the party-state form of China, the electoral developmental form of India and the managed electoral form of the Global South cluster. The count says how many rows differ. It does not say how hard a change would be.

Source: the project's own coding of the five cases in 2026, set against its definitions of the forms. The coding rests on public data and on judgment. Some cells of the coding draw on the Integrated Values Surveys (2024; the European Values Study and the World Values Survey) and on UNU-WIDER's Government Revenue Dataset (2025), both through Our World in Data.

The values as a table
Liberal-democraticParty-stateElectoral developmentalManaged electoral
United States0424
European Union0547
China5036
India4401
Global South cluster5520

How the world could get there

The project built this pathway backward from 2100 to today. It turns on refusals: no holder of power would give way, and no rival could force it. No step is judged infeasible, but several rest on conditions no work the project read supplies, and all would have to hold at once, with platforms never taking over two of the domains of money, security, speech and movement.

  1. In an exploratory count of the 20 episodes since 1914 in which a liberal democracy declined, 14 have a known outcome and 7 of those avoided breakdown. The other 6 are open, among them the decline that the United States is in today, and none of the decided ones was in an old, rich democracy. A count of past cases is not a forecast for one country. Here that decline would close by 2040 without breakdown.
  2. The need for people's work would weaken after 2040 and then stop falling, a condition no work the project read supplies.
  3. China would grow slowly and age without opening its politics, though a work the project read holds that only opening can save its model.
  4. By 2060 heat would have broken several governments of the cluster, most rebuilt in place, some as military regimes keeping elections in form; this holds only if democracy does not spread there and no rebuilt regime drops that claim.
  5. From 2075 to 2100 every case would have to hold without a break, and if the need for work fell further, no actor in the works the project read could and would keep consent.

Who gains, who loses, what strains

In this scenario the winners would be those who own machines, land and offices, and the old in the rich cases whose pensions hold. The losers would be the excluded class in the rich cases, the young of India and the cluster, minorities under majority claims, and the democrats of the cluster, whose gains would end its kind of order. Each order would carry a contradiction. In the United States the weight of a vote would fall as work does, and in the European Union ageing would erode transfers. In China a slowdown would test the claim of results, in India a second claim of religion and nation could become the first, and in the cluster heat could break capacity. The liberal democracies would keep the means to change course, elections and courts, while China's order would come near lock-in, an order that technology holds in place. Ways out to other scenarios would stay open in 2100, though China's would narrow.

What this page does not show

What would break this scenario, the signposts that would show it coming, and its probability are not on this page. A first round of probabilities is in the project's log, and a review that tries to break each scenario and its probabilities is under way.

This page condenses a working draft. It may change as the work goes on.